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Textualism's Limits on the Administrative State:
Of Isolated Waters, Barking Dogs, and Chevron
by Michael P. Healy
InSolid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County(SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, I the U.S.
Supreme Court recently held that the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (the Corps) does not have authority under the
Clean Water Act (the Act or the CWA)2to regulate the filling
of "other waters." This decision demonstrates a major shift
in the Court's approach to statutory interpretation, particu-
larly in the context of reviewing an agency's understanding
of a statute. The significance of the case is best gauged by
contrasting it with United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc' There, the Court, acting just one year after it
had famously established its deferential regime for the re-
view of agency legal interpretations in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,' held unani-
mously that the Corps had discretion to interpret the CWA
contrary to the apparent meaning of the statutory text.6 In re-
turning to the issue of the jurisdictional scope of the CWA
15 years later, the Court's bare conservative majority has
now interpreted the Act to have a clear textual meaning and
to foreclose an agency inte~retation accepted and enforced
by several administrations.
This Article will summarize briefly the factual back-
ground to the Court's decisions in SWANCC and Riverside
Bayview Homes, and then compare the Court's interpretive
approach to resolving the statutory issue in the two cases.
This comparison will focus on the Court's shift to a textual-
ist interpretive method and the Court's deviation from the
principle of statutory stare decisis.' The Article will then
discuss how the Court's textualist approach in SWANCC
yields an interpretation that has no contextual legitimacy
and undermines the federal regime of water pollution con-
trol.' The final section of the Article examines the Court's
activist use of a clear statement rule in rejecting the Corps'
Dorothy Salmon Professor of Law. University of Kentucky College of
Law. J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1984; B.A., Williams College,
1978. Many thanks to my colleague, John Rogers. for his comments on a
previous draft. Any errors are my own.
I. 121 S. Ct. 675, 31 ELR 20382 (2001).
2. 33 U.s.C. §§1251-1387, ELR STAT.FWPCA §§101-607.
3. The regulatory definition of "other waters" is set out in infra note 17.
4. 474 U.S. 121. 16 ELR 20086 (1985).
5. 467 U.S. 837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984).
6. See 474 U.S. at 132, 16 ELR at 20090 ("00 a purely linguistic level,
it may appear unreasonable to classify 'lands,' wet or otherwise,
as 'waters. "').
7. In 1986, the Court first asserted jurisdiction over "other waters,"
based upon the use ofthose waters by migratory birds and waterfowl.
See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
8. See infra section, A Comparison of the Court's Decisions in
SWANCC and Riverside Bayview Homes: Whither Stare Decisis.
9. See infra section, Textualism's "Pernicious Oversimplification" of
the CWA's Contextual Meaning.
request for deference under Chevron.!OThis rule has the ef-
fect of ignoring the stron~ evidence-the metaphorical, in-
sistent barking of dogs I-that Congress intended the
broadest scope to the exercise of federal authority over the
nation's waters when it enacted and amended the CWA.
A Comparison of the Court's Decisious in SWANCC
and Riverside Bayview Homes: Whither Stare Decisis
The regulatory structure established by the CWA is quite
simple. The Act prohibits the discharge of any pollutant b(,
any person unless the discharge is authorized by a permit. 2
Section 404(a) of the Act provides that "[t]he Secretary may
issue permits after notice and opportunity for public hear-
ings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the nav-
igable waters at specified disposal sites.?" The term, "navi-
gable waters," is defined by the Act as "the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas."!'
The Corps has promulgated regulations that "define[] the
term 'waters of the United States' as it applies to the juris-
dictional limits of the [Corps] under the [CWA]."" Those
regulations, first adopted in 1977/6 provide that the Corps
has regulatory jurisdiction over "other waters," defined in
the regulations as "waters ... , the use, degradation or de-
struction of which could affect interstate ... com-
merce .... ,,17 In 1986, the Corps explained that the effect on
interstate commerce that results in the application ofCWA
jurisdiction arises when these other waters "are or would be
10. See infra section, SWANCC and the Judicial Activism of Clear State-
ment Rules.
11. See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (discussing the bark-
ing dog canon of construction).
12. See 33 U.S.C. §1311(a), ELR STAT.FWPCA §301(a).
13. Id. §1344(a), ELR STAT.FWPCA §404(a).
14. /d. §1362(7). ELR STAT.FWPCA §502(7).
15. 33 C.F.R. §328.1.
16. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37122 (July 19, 1977).
17. 33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(3) defines "waters of the United States"
to include:
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats,
wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa
lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of
which could affect interstate or foreign commerce including
any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign trav-
elers for recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and
sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose
by industries in interstate commerce; ....
/d.
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used as habitat by birds protected by the Migratory Bird
Treaties" or "are or would be used as habitat by other migra-
tory birds which cross state lincs.?"
In SWANCC, a group of localities was formed to develop
a site for the disposal of municipal waste. I' The group
learned about:
the availabilityof a 533-acreparcel, bestridingthe Illi-
nois counties Cook and Kane, which had been the site of
a sand and gravel pit mining operation for three decades
up until about 1960. Long since abandoned, the old min-
ing site eventually gave way to a successional stage for-
est, with its remnant excavation trenches evolving into a
scatteringof permanent and seasonal ponds of varying
size (from under one-tenth of an acre to several acres)
and depth (from several inches to several feet)?O
The group decided that it wished to purchase and develop
this site and sought any permits that were necessary for the
project. Although the Corps first decided that a §404 permit
was not necessary for the project," the Corps later con-
cluded that a permit was necessary because the aquatic areas
on the site that had to be filled as part of the development
project were habitat to many species of migratory birds and
were accordingly "other waters" as defined by regulations."
When the Corps later declined to issue a §404 permit,23 the
Solid Waste Agency of North ern Cook County (SWANCq
brought an action in federal court, claiming both that the
Corps' permit decision was unlawful and that the Corps
lacked jurisdiction to require a permit for the filling of the
"other waters. ,,24
In Riverside Bayview Homes," the property owner
sought to develop "80 acres of low-lying, marshy land near
the shores of Lake St. Clair in Macomb County, Michigan,"
and "began to place fill materials on its property as part ofits
18. 51 Fed. Reg. 41206.41217 (Nov. 13, 1986). This interpretationof
the Act was not the result of notice-and-comment rulemaking. See
Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County v. Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S.
Ct. 675. 678. 31 ELR 20382 (2001).
19. See SWANCC. at 678. 31 ELR at 20382.
20. lei.
21. See id. ("The Corps initially concluded that it had no jurisdiction
over the site because it contained no 'wetlands,' or areas which sup-
port 'vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil condi-
tions,' 33 CPR §328.3(b) (1999).").
22. See id.
[A]fter the Illinois Nature Preserves Commission informed
the Corps that a number of migratory bird species had been
observed at the site, the Corps reconsidered and ultimately
asserted jurisdiction over the balefill site pursuant to subpart
(b) of the "Migratory Bird Rule." The Corps found that ap-
proximately 121 bird species had been observed at the site,
including several known to depend upon aquatic environ-
ments for a significant portion of their life requirements.
ld.
23. The Corps concluded that:
SWANCC had not established that its proposal was the "least
environmentally damaging, most practicable alternative" for
disposal of nonhazardous solid waste; that SWANCC's fail-
ure to set aside sufficient funds to remediate leaks posed an
"unacceptable risk to the public's drinking water supply";
and that the impact of the project upon area-sensitive species
was "unmitigatable since a landfill surface cannot be redevel-
oped into a forested habitat."
ld. al 679. 31 ELR at 20383.
24. See id.
25. 474 U.S. at 121. 16 ELR at 20086.
preparations for construction of a housing development.v"
The Corps determined that the area being filled was a wet-
land adjacent to navigable waters" and was accordingly
within the regulatory definition of "waters of the United
States."" The Corps brought an action in federal court to en-
join the unpermitted filling.29
These two cases raised issues about the extent of the
Corps' jurisdiction under §404 and turned on whether the
isolated aquatic sites in SWANCC and the wetlands adjacent
to navigable waters in Riverside Bayview Homes could rea-
sonably be defined as "waters of the United States" under
the CWA. The Court employed different interpretive meth-
ods to resolve the jurisdictional question in the two cases
and, as a consequence, reached different conclusions about
the lawfulness of the agency's regulations. In SWANCC, the
Court decided that the Corps lacked authority under the
CWA to regulate aquatic sites that are not physically con-
nected to traditional navigable waters of the United States."
In Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court decided that the
Corps had acted reasonably in exercising its discretion un-
der the CWA when the Corps adopted regulations that as-
serted jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to waters of the
United States." We will now turn to consider the Court's in-
terpretive approach in SWANCC and how that approach
compares to Riverside Bayview Homes.
The Textualist Method in SWANCC
The SWANCC majority's interpretation of the jurisdictional
reach of the CWA is based wholly on the "clear" meaning of
the statutory text.32 In the Court's view, notwithstanding the
apparent breadth of the statutory definition, Congress' use
of the term "navigable waters" in the CWAindicated that the
statute applies only when the waters at issue are physically
connected to waters that meet the traditional test ofnaviga-
bility.33The Court bolstered its conclusion that this was the
26. lei. at 124. 16 ELR at 20087.
27. Lake St. Clair lies along a portion of the border between Michigan
and Canada. There was no dispute that the lake itself was a navigable
water of the United States.
28. 33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(7).
29. See 474 U.S. at 124. 16 ELR at 20087.
30. See infra section, The Textualist Method in SW ANCC.
31. See infra section, Riverside Bayview Homes' Contextual Approach
to Interpretation.
32. See SWANCC. 121 S. Ct. at683. 31 ELR 20384 ("We find §404(a) to
be clear"); ("In order to rule for respondents here, we would have to
hold that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds that are not
adjacent to open water. But we conclude that the text of the statute
will not allow this.") Id. at 680,31 ELR at 20383 (emphasis in origi-
nal); see also ("Because 'subsequent history is less illuminating than
the contemporaneous evidence,' respondents face a difficult task in
overcoming the plain text and import of §404(a)."). Id. at 682, 31
ELR at 20384 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
33. The Court's view was that:
We cannot agree that Congress' separate definitional use of
the phrase "waters of the United States" constitutes a basis for
reading the term "navigable waters" out of the statute. We
said in Riverside Bayview Homes that the word "navigable"
in the statute was of "limited effect" and went on to hold that
§404(a) extended to nonnavigable wetlands adjacent to open
waters. But it is one thing to give a word limited effect and
quite another to give it no effect whatever. The term "naviga-
ble" has at least the import of showing us what Congress had
in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional
jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in
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meaning of the statute by relying on the fact that the Corps
had given the statute this limited effect in 1974 when it first
promulgated regulations for the §404 program."
This was not the end ofthe Court's textual analysis, how-
ever. The Corps had sought to support the legality of its reg-
ulation by its contention that the statute was ambiguous in
defining its jurisdictional reach and the Court, therefore, had
to defer to the Corps' regulation under Chevron." Indeed,
fact or which could reasonably be so made. See, e.g., United
States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-08
(1940).
121S. Ct. at 682-83, 31 ELR at 20384.
34. The Court first relied on the Corps' initial, limited view of §404 ju-
risdiction in defending a narrow meaning of the terms of the CWA.
The Court stated that:
Indeed, the Corps' original interpretation of the CWA,
promulgated two years after its enactment, is inconsistent
with thai which it espouses here. Its 1974 regulations defined
§404(a)'s "navigable waters" to mean "those waters of the
United Stales which are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide,and/orare presently,or havebeenin thepast,ormaybe
in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or
foreign commerce." 33 CPR §209.120(d)(l). The Corps em-
phasized that "[i]t is the water body's capability of use by the
public for purposes of transportation or commerce which is
the determinative factor," §209.260(e)(I), Respondents put
forward no persuasive evidence that the Corps mistook Con-
gress' intent in 1974.
Id. at 680, 31 ELR at 20383 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
The Court returned to rely on that original Corps understanding
when it rejected the Corps' attempt to rely on post-enactment con-
gressional acquiescence. See id. at 681 n.5, 31 ELR at 20384 n.5:
("[W]e are loath to replace the plain text and original under-
standing of a statute with an amended agency interpretation."
(citation omitted)).
In a forthcoming article, I contend that a common understanding
ofa statute that is reflected in common practice, or communis opinio
in the terminology of the ancient canon, provides very strong evi-
dence of the statute's meaning. See Michael P. Healy, Communis
Opinio and the Methods of Statutory Interpretation: Interpreting
Law or Changing Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming
2001). The Corps' 1974 interpretation of the statute, however, can
hardly be said to reflect the common understanding of the CWA's
meaning: it was, rather, the Corps' own idiosyncratic understanding.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rejected the
Corps' limited view of§404 jurisdiction from the outset. See 121 S.
Ct. at 689 & n.lO, 31 ELR at 20386 & n.lO. Moreover, the Corps'
view was very quickly rejected in court. See id. at 689 & n.c, 31 ELR
at 20386 & n.9 (citing Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Callaway,392F. Supp.685, 686, 5 ELR20285(D.D.C. 1975)and
United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 673, 4 ELR 20710,
20715 (M.D. Fla. 1974)). When Congress amended the CWA in
1977, it too rejected an amendment that would have tied CWAju-
risdiction to the concept of navigability. See 121 S. Ct. at 690, 31
ELR at 20386. Finally, the jurisdictional limit accepted by the
Court in Riverside Bayview Homes was outside the limit initially
identified by the Corps in 1974. In short, the Court is grasping for
straws, or make weights, to claim that the Corps' initial view of the
extent of CWA jurisdiction has probative value in discerning the
CWA's meaning.
35. See 121 S. Ct. at 683, 31 ELRat 20384. In Chevron, the Court estab-
lished the following two-step analysis of the legality of an agency's
legal interpretation:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the stat-
ute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Con-
gress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at is-
sue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on
the Court itself had found the definition of "navigable wa-
ters" to be ambiguous in Riverside Bayview Homes and had
deferred to the Corps' exercise of regulatory jurisdiction
over wetlands adjacent to navigable waters.36 In response to
the Corps' call for deference here, the Court held that the
meaning of the statute's text was plainly contrary to the
Corps' position, and that even an ambiguous text would not
have resulted in deference on this question." The Court held
that the Corps had to show clear statutory authority for its
exercise of jurisdiction, rather than rely upon an inferential
delegation of discretionary power to the agency:
These are significant constitutional questions raised
by respondents' application of their regulations, and yet
we find nothing approaching a clear statement from
Congress that it intended §404(a) to reach an abandoned
sand and gravel pit such as we have here. Permitting re-
spondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and
mudflats falling within the "Migratory Bird Rule" would
result in a significant impingement of the States' tradi-
tional and primary power over land and water use. See,
e.g., Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation,
513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) ("[R]egu1ation of land use [is] a
function traditionally performed by local govern-
ments"). Rather than expressing a desire to readjust the
federal-state balance in this manner, Congress chose to
"recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsi-
hilities and rights of States ... to plan the development
and use ... ofland and water resources ..... ' 33 U.S.C.
§1251(b), We thus read the statute as written to avoid the
significant constitutional and federalism questions
raised by respondents' interpretation, and therefore re-
ject the request for administrative deference."
the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an admin-
istrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or am-
biguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a pennissi-
ble construction of the statute.
467 U.S. at 842-44, 14ELR at 20508-09 (footnotesomitted).
36. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
37. The Court accordingly assumed the applicability of Chevron and
then explained why, in its view, Chevron deference was unwar-
ranted. Because the "Migratory Bird Rule" was an interpretation of
the statute that had not been adopted following notice-and-comment
rulemaking, see supra note 18, the Court might have applied the rea-
soning of Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000) and
held that Chevron deference was inapplicable. In Christensen, the
Court declined to extend Chevron deference to an Opinion Letter
from the Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division. The Court
concluded that:
[W]e confront an interpretation contained in an opinion let-
ter, not one arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudica-
tion or notice-and-comment rulemaking. Interpretations
such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations con-
tained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforce-
ment guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do not
warrant Chevron-style deference. Instead, interpretations
contained in formats such as opinion letters are "entitled to
respect" under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co" 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944), but only to the extent that those inter-
pretations have the "power to persuade."
120 S. Ct. at 1662-63 (citations omitted). Because, in the
SWANCC Court's view, the Corps' interpretation was not lawful
under Chevron's more deferential standard, it is plain that the in-
terpretation would have failed also if the Court had employed
Skidmore deference.
38. 121S.Ct. at683-84,31ELRat20384-85(emphasisaddedandfoot-
note omitted).
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For the majority, therefore, unlike in Riverside Bayview
Homes, ambiguity was an insufficient basis for the Corps'
assertion of regulatory authority. The majority's use of a
clear statement rule to interpret the CWA is quite important
because it responds to the Corps' call for Chevron deference
by shifting the burden to tbe Corps to come forward with an
express delegation of authority from Congress to support its
jurisdiction, rather than mere statutory ambiguity. Although
the Court does not explain why this clear statement require-
ment should not also have foreclosed the Corps' interpreta-
tion of jurisdiction in Riverside Bayview Homes, the reason
would have to be that there the Corps had asserted jurisdic-
tion over wetlands adjacent to waters that were unarguably
"navigable waters.,,39The fact that the wetlands were physi-
cally adjacent to those waters meant that there was no con-
stitutional uncertainty about Congress' constitutional
power to regulate."
In defining this clear statement rule, the Court is quite coy
in explaining whether its requirement may be met only by
clear text or whether a showing of clear congressional intent
external to the statutory text is sufficient. The Court's asser-
tion of its conclusion that there was no clear statement pro-
vides strong support for the view that a textual clear state-
ment is necessary: "We thus read the statute as written to
avoid the significant constitutional and federalism ques-
tions raised by respondents' interpretation, and therefore re-
ject the request for administrative deference.,,4l A focus on
the meaning of the written statute is often a coded way for
textualists to describe the essence oftheir interpretive meth-
odology.42Also, the fact that the SWANCC Court insistently
focused on the statutory words, "navigable waters," lends
39. See supra note 27.
40. The direct connection related to the wetlands' physical location ad-
jacent to Lake St. Clair. The source of the water that gave rise to the
wetland conditions was groundwater, rather than the adjacent. navi-
gable surface waters of Lake St. Clair. See infra note 61 and accom-
panying text.
41. 121 S. Ct. at 684,31 ELR at 20385 (emphasis added and footnote
omitted).
42. In his decision in In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989), Judge
Easterbrook, a prominent textualist, has briefly summarized the ap-
proach of textualism in the following tenus:
Statutes are law, not evidence of law. References to "in-
tent" in judicial opinions do not imply that legislators' mo-
tives and beliefs, as opposed to their public acts, establish the
norms to which all others must conform. "Original meaning"
rather than "intent" frequently captures the interpretive task
more precisely, reminding us that it is the work of the political
branches (the "meaning") rather than of the courts that mat-
ters, and that their work acquires its meaning when enacted
("originally"). Revisionist history may be revelatory; revi-
sionist judging is simply unfaithful to the enterprise. Justice
Holmes made the point when denouncing a claim that judges
should give weight to the intent of a document's authors:
[A statute] does not disclose one meaning conclusively ac-
cording to the laws of language. Thereupon we ask, not
what this man meant, but what those words would mean in
the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the
circumstances in which they were used .... But the normal
speaker of English is merely a special variety, a literary
form, so to speak, of our old friend the prudent man. He is
external to the particular writer, and a reference to him as
the criterion is simply another instance of the externality of
the law .... We do not inquire what the legislature meant;
we ask only what the statute means ....
[d. at 1343 (citations omitted).
weight to a conclusion that the Court would require a clear
textual delegation to the Corps.
In other important ways, however, the Court's decision
suggests that clear and expressly affirmative legislative
history would be sufficient. Most importantly, the Court
used the following language to explain the clear state-
ment requirement:
Where an administrative interpretation of a statute in-
vokes the outer limits of Congress' power, we expect a
clear indication that Congress intended that result. This
requirement stems from our prudential desire not to
needlessly reach constitutional issues and our assump-
tion that Congress does not casually authorize adminis-
trative agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of
congressional authority. This concern is heightened
where the administrative interpretation alters the fed-
eral-state framework by permitting federal encroach-
ment upon a traditional state power. Thus, "where an
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will con-
strue the statute to avoid such problems unless such con-
struction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress ."43
By referring to congressional intent, the Court would appar-
ently permit consideration of legislative history, which is
the most common evidence oflegislative intent. Moreover,
although the Court did not include any discussion of the
CWA's legislative history when it concluded that there was
no clear statement, the Court had earlier stated its view that
the legislative history was ambiguous with respect to the
Corps' exercise of jurisdiction over isolated waters." The
fact that the Court appears to be of two minds regarding the
nature of the required clear statement suggests that one or
more Justices among the five in the majority were unwilling
to consider legislative history when deciding whether a
clear statement was present." Even assuming that the
43. 121 S. Ct. at 683, 31 ELR at 20384 (emphasis added; citations and
one internal quotation omitted).
44. See id. at 680n.3, 31 ELR at 20383 n.3 (quoted infra in note 67).
45. A reasonable inference from a prior decision raising analogous is-
sues is that Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clar-
ence Thomas likely supported a requirement that the text include the
clear statement. In Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244
(1994), Justice John P. Stevens wrote a majority opinion that was
joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, the other two members of the majority in SWANCC.
There, the Court held that there must be "clear evidence of congres-
sional intent" before a statue may be applied retroactively.ld. at 286.
In deciding that there was no such clear intent in that case, the Court
reviewed statutory text as well as legislative history. See td. at
255-63. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment in an opinion
joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas. He accepted the need for a
clear statement, but strongly objected to the willingness of the ma-
jority to look beyond the text to discern whether a clear statement
was present:
The Court ... is willing to let th[e] clear statement be sup-
plied, not by the text of the law in question, but by individual
legislators who participated in the enactment of the law, and
even legislators in an earlier Congress which tried and failed
to enact a similar law ....
This effectively converts the "clear statement" rule into a
"discernible legislative intent" rule .... If it is a "clear state-
ment" we are seeking, surely it is not enough to insist that the
statement can "plausibly be read as reflecting general agree-
ment"; the statement must clearly reflect general agreement.
No legislative history can do that, of course, but only the text
of the statute itself. ...
/d. at 287 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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SWANCC Court did grudgingly consider legislative history,
its failure to discern any clear intent, des'l.\te Justice John P.
Stevens' strong intentionalist argument, gives an impor-
tant indication of the nature of the clear statement that the
Court is demanding: Congress must be clear and specific in
its delegation of the constitutionally questionable power. A
very broadly intended jurisdictional grant of the sort found
in the CWA and its legislative history is insufficient to give
the agency regulatory discretion."
In sum, the Court bolstered its reading of the text of the
CWA with a clear statement rule that barred deference to the
agency based on the regulatory power being exercised.
Given that the Court employed the clear statement rule to
ensure an adequate legislative grant of regulatory authority,
the Court should have been more specific about the nature of
its requirement, so that Congress would have meaningful
guidance. The Court's lack of clarity means that if Congress
wishes to be sure that the Court will allow the exercise of ad-
ministrative discretion, Congress will have to employ
lengthy and express delegations in statutory text.
Riverside Bayview Homes' Contextual Approach to
Interpretation
The Court's interpretive approach in SWANCC contrasts
starkly with the approach in Riverside Bayview Homes. The
contrast is apparent from the outset of the Court's analysis in
the earlier decision, which described Chevron deference and
looked toward a range oflegal sources to resolve the inter-
pretive issue:
An agency's construction ofa statute it is charged with
enforcing is entitled to deference if it is reasonable and
not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress. Ac-
cordingly, our review is limited to the question whether it
is reasonable, in light of the language, policies. and legis-
lative history of the Act for the Corps to exercise juris-
diction over wetlands adjacent to but not regularly
flooded by rivers, streams, and other hydrographic fea-
tures more conventionally identifiable as "waters. ,,48
In addition to the Court's acceptance of the interpretive sig-
nificance of the Act's "policies, and legislative history," its
interpretive approach contrasts with SWANCC because the
Court so readily and promptly dispensed with giving the
statute's text a determinate and narrow meaning:
46. See infra section, Textualism's "Pernicious Oversimplification" of
the CW A's Contextual Meaning.
47. In this respect. by requiring a clear statement from Congress, rather
than relying on the statute's broad terms as well as the intent and pur-
poses of that broad delegation, the Court effectively requires that
Congress catalogue all constitutionally questionable applications of
the delegated authority. If such a catalogue were to omit a certain
questionable application, this textualist Court would likely infer that
Congress' omission gives rise to a negative inference that Congress
did not intend the omitted application. Needless to say. such an ap-
proach demands remarkable foresight and comprehensiveness from
the legislative branch. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)
(White, J., concurring). In criticizing the Court's application ofa tex-
tual clear statement rule, Justice Byron R.White decried the results:
The vagueness of the majority's rule undoubtedly will lead
States to assert that various federal statutes no longer apply to
a wide variety of state activities if Congress has not expressly
referred to those activities in the statute. Congress, in tum,
will be forced to draft long and detailed lists of which particu-
lar state functions it meant to regulate.
u. at 478.
48. 474 U.S.at 131, 16ELRat20088(citations and footnote omitted).
On a purely linguistic level, it may appear unreason-
able to classify "lands," wet or otherwise, as "waters."
Such a simplistic response, however, does justice neither
to the problem faced by the Corps in defining the scope
of its authority under §404(a) nor to the realities of the
problem of water pollution that the [CWA] was intended
to combat. 49
The Court's approach to interpretation in Riverside Bay-
view Homes also differs markedly from the approach in
SWANCC, because in the former case the Court was defer-
ential toward the exercise of agency expertise in addressing
problems as to which Congress had intended a comprehen-
sive regulatory approach:
Faced with such a problem of defining the bounds of
its regulatory authority, an agency may appropriately
look to the legislative history and underlying policies of
its statutory grants of authority. Neither of these sources
provides unambiguous guidance for the Corps in this
case, but together they do support the reasonableness of
the Corps' approach of defining adjacent wetlands as
"waters" within the meaning of §404(a). Section 404
originated as part of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, which constituted a compre-
hensive legislative attempt "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Na-
tion's waters." This objective incorporated a broad, sys-
temic view of the goal of maintaining and improving wa-
ter quality: as the House Report on the legislation put it,
"the word 'integrity' ... refers to a condition in which the
natural structure and function of ecosystems is [are]
maintained." Protection of aquatic ecosystems, Con-
gress recognized, demanded broad federal authority to
control pollution, for "[wlater moves in hydrologic cy-
cles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be con-
trolled at the source. ,,50
The Court in Riverside Bayview Homes relied, moreover,
on the breadth of this concern with water pollution control to
understand Congress' broad definition of waters subject to
regulation under the Act:
In keeping with these views, Congress chose to define
the waters covered by the Act broadly. Although the Act
prohibits discharges into "navigable waters," the Act's
definition of "navigable waters" as «the waters of the
United States" makes it clear that the tenn "navigable"
as used in the Act is of limited import. In adopting this
definition of "navigable waters," Congress evidently
intended to repudiate limits that had been placed on fed-
eral regulation by earlier water pollution control stat-
utes and to exercise its powers under the Commerce
Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not
be deemed "navwable" under the classical understand-
ing of that term.
The Court also based its acceptance of the Corps' broad
assertion of jurisdiction under the CWA on the actions of
Congress when it amended the statute in 197752 During its
consideration of proposed amendments to the Act, Congress
considered whether the Corps' regulations had extended
CWA jurisdiction too broadly.53 Ultimately, however,
49. Jd. at t32. t6 ELR at 20088-89.
50. [d. at 132-33, 16 ELR at 20089 (citations omitted).
51. [d. at 133, 16 ELR at 20089 (citations omitted).
52. See Pub. L. No. 95-217.
53. See 474 U.S. at 136, 16ELR at 20090 ("Proponents ofa more limited
§404 jurisdiction contended that the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction
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Congress declined to rein in the scope of the Act:
"[E]fforts to narrow the definition of 'waters' were aban-
doned; the legislation as ultimately passed, in the words
of Senator Baker, 'retain] ed] the comprehensive jurisdic-
tion over the Nation's waters exercised in the 1972 Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act. ",54 The Court's conclu-
sion was that "[i]n the end ... Congress acquiesced in the
administrative construction.t'P
SWANCC's Inconsistency With Stare Decisis
As we have seen, the Court in Riverside Bayview Homes
concluded that the CWA's purpose and legislative history
had created an ambiguity regarding the Act's regulatory
scope and had impliedly delegated authority to the Corps to
resolve the question of jurisdiction. In SWANCC, however,
the Court relied on the Act's text and a clear statement rule to
reject the existence of any ambiguity and implied delega-
tion. The only way to reconcile the decisions is to decide
that, although the statute was ambiguous with respect to the
treatment of certain "waters," i.e., wetlands adjacent to nav-
igable waters, the statute's meaning was clear in excluding
other waters, i.e., so-called isolated waters. Under this view
of the Corps' regulations, the Corps would be seen as having
sought to exercise discretion along two different axes in the
two cases.
The first axis was at issue in Riverside Bayview Homes
and it demarcated the place at which land becomes water
when there is a claimed physical connection between the lo-
cus in question and navigable waters. Under this view of the
action at issue inRiverside Bayview Homes, the significance
of navigability to the Corps' exercise of jurisdiction would
be retained and the question impliedly delegated to the
Corps would be the identification of the permissible physi-
cal connection between the site at issue and navigable wa-
ters. Indeed, this appears to be the SWANCC Court's view of
the earlier decision. 56 SWANCC could then be conceptual-
over wetlands and other nonnavigable 'waters' had far exceeded
what Congress had intended in enacting §404.").
54. [d. (footnote omitted).
55. [d. at 135-36. 16 ELR at 20089-90.
[11 he scope of the Corps I asserted jurisdiction over wetlands
was specifically brought to Congress' attention, and Con-
gress rejected measures designed to curb the Corps' jurisdic-
tion in large part because of its concern that protection of
wetlands would be unduly hampered by a narrowed defini-
tion of "navigable waters." Although we are chary of attribut-
ing significance to Congress' failure to act, a refusal by Con-
gress to overrule an agency's construction of legislation is at
least some evidence of the reasonableness of that construc-
tion, particularly where the administrative construction has
been brought to Congress' attention through legislation spe-
cifically designed to supplant it.
[d. at 137, 16 ELR at 20090 (citation omitted).
56. See 121 S. Ct. at 680, 31 ELR at 20383 (citation omitted), where the
SWANCCCourt made the following claim about the decision in Riv-
erside Bayview Homes:
Itwas the significant nexus between the wetlands and "navi-
gable waters" that informed our reading of the CWA in River-
side Bayview Homes. Indeed, we did not "express any opin-
ion" on the "question of the authority of the Corps to regulate
discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent
to bodies of open water ... ." In order to rule for respondents
here, we would have to hold that the jurisdiction of the Corps
extends to ponds that are not adjacent to open water."
[d. (emphasis in original; citation omitted),
ized as considering a different, second axis that concerned
the regulatory scope of the CWA regarding waters that had
no such physical connection to navigable waters of the
United States." Conceptualized in this manner, a site may
itself be unquestionably comprised of water, but neverthe-
less be outside CWA jurisdiction because it lacks the nec-
essary physical connection to navigable waters of the
United States.
This conceptualization of the 1985 decision fails utterly
to hold water, as it were, when proper and fair account is
given to the rationale ofthat decision. At the outset, it must
be accepted that, in an important respect, some of the
Court's language in Riverside Bayview Homes may be read
as accepting the Corps' decision as lawful because it was
taken along the first axis. This is because the question there
about whether the wetlands were "waters of the United
States" implicated a judgment about the physical bound-
aries of an area already accepted as "navigable waters." In
the Riverside Bayview Homes Court's words:
In determining the limits of its power to regulate dis-
charges under the Act, the Corps must necessarily
choose some point at which water ends and land begins.
Our common experience tells us that this is often no easy
task: the transition from water to solid ground is not nec-
essarily or even typically an abrupt one. Rather, between
open waters and dry land may lie shallows, marshes,
mudflats, swamps, bogs-in short, a huge array of areas
thatarenotwhollyaquatichut neverthelessfall far short
of being dry land. Where on this continuum to find the
limit of "waters" is far from obvious."
Even at this most general level of analysis, however, the
Court makes no reference to the navigability of the waters
whose boundary is at issue.
As the Court's consideration of the Corps' exercise ofju-
risdiction in 1985 became more focused, however, the
Court's analysis plainly clarified that it had not accepted the
legality of the Corps' decision based on a conclusion that the
Corps reasonably identified the limits of navigability, since
the exercise of regulatory jurisdiction over the wetlands
plainly exceeded those limits. Rather, the Court concluded
that the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable because the
Corps had acted reasonably to protect the environmental
quality of the nation's waters. The Court in no way sought to
constrain the protection authorized by the Act by requiring
that a physical nexus with navigability be proved:
Of course, it is one thing to recognize that Congress
intended to allow regulation of waters that might not sat-
isfy traditional tests of navigability; it is another to assert
that Congress intended to abandon traditional notions of
"waters" and include in that term "wetlands" as well.
Nonetheless, the evident breadth of congressional con-
cern for protection of water quality and aquatic ecosys-
57. The Court might have considered a third axis along which the Corps'
jurisdiction could be defined: the temporal duration of the aquatic
sites at issue. Such an axis might have allowed the SWANCC Court to
hold that there was no CWA jurisdiction over the portions of
SWANCC's property that were ponded only on a seasonal basis. But
cf Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360, 20 ELR
20477,20481 (1990) (rejecting a limit on CWA jurisdiction based
on the seasonal character of the aquatic site). Underthe Court's deci-
sion in SWANCC, the Corps apparently has authority to regulate sea-
sonal "waters of the United States," provided that they have a suffi-
cient physical connection to navigable waters.
58. 474 U.S. at 132, 16 ELR at 20089.
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terns suggests that it is reasonable for the Corps to inter-
pret the term "waters" to encompass wetlands adjacent
to waters as more conventionally defined. Following
the lead of the Environmental Protection Agency, see
38 Fed. Reg. 10834 (1973), the Corps has determined
that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters do as a gen-
eral matter playa key role in protecting and enhancing
water quality:
"The regulation of activities that cause water pol-
lution cannot rely on ... artificial lines .. ,but must fo-
cus on all waters that together fonn the entire aquatic
system. Water moves in hydrologic cycles, and the
pollution of this part of the aquatic system, regardless
of whether it is above or below an ordinary high water
mark, or mean high tide line, will affect the water
quality of the other waters within that aquatic system.
"For this reason, the landward limit of Federal ju-
risdiction under Section 404 must include any adja-
cent wetlands that form the border of or are in reason-
able proximity to other waters of the United States, as
these wetlands are part of this aquatic system." 42
Fed. Reg. 37128 (1977)."
In the Riverside Bayview Homes Court's view, the exer-
cise of jurisdiction was reasonable because it reflected, at
bottom, "the Corps' ecological judgment about the relation-
ship between waters and their adjacent wetlandsv'" and not,
as SWANCC would have it, a reasonable judgment about the
furthest limits of the notion of navigability.
The conclusion that the Riverside Bayview Homes Court
was concerned with and deferred to the Corps' ecologic
judgment about the significance of wetlands to the aquatic
system is confirmed by two other aspects of the Court's
analysis. First, the wetlands at issue in Riverside Bayview
Homes, though adjacent to Lake St. Croix, were saturated
by groundwater, rather than the lake's surface water." The
Court addressed this fact not by reference to how it impacted
upon the wetlands' connection to navigable waters, which
would have been the decisive issue under SWANCC's read-
ing of Riverside Bayview Homes, but rather bi its relevance
to the wetlands' ecological significance.6 Second, the
59. [d. at 133-34,16ELRat 20089.
60. [d. at 134, 16 ELR at 20089, where the Court stated that:
We cannot say that the Corps' conclusion that adjacent
wetlands are inseparably bound up with the "waters" of the
United States-based as itison the Corps' and EPA's techni-
cal expertise-is unreasonable. In view of the breadth of fed-
eral regulatory authority contemplated by the Act itself and
the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to
regulable waters, the Corps' ecological judgment about the
relationship between waters and their adjacent wetlands pro-
vides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent
wetlands may be defined as waters under the Act.
[d.
61. See id. at t30-31,t6 ELRat 20088.
62. The Court stated that:
[Tlhe Corps has concluded that wetlands adjacent to lakes,
rivers, streams, and other bodies of water may function as in-
tegral parts of the aquatic environment even when the mois-
ture creating the wetlands does not find its source in the adja-
cent bodies of water. Again, we cannot say that the Corps'
judgment on these matters is unreasonable. and we therefore
conclude that a definitionof"waters of the United States" en-
compassing all wetlands adjacent to other bodies of water
over which the Corps has jurisdiction is a permissible inter-
pretation of the Act. Because respondent's property is part of
Court indicated that the Corps' exercise of jurisdiction was
based on the Corps' assessment of the broad ecological sig-
nificance of wetlands and that more specific judgments
about the ecological significance of particular sites could be
made at the time the Corps reviewed the §404 permit appli-
cation." In sum, concerns about navigability are wholly for-
eign to the Court's understanding of the Corps' exercise of
delegated regulatory authority and the reason for its legality.
If the SWANCC Court had actually applied the reasoning
of the Court in Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court would
have had to consider and reject the earlier case's acceptance
of an ecological-connection rationale for the Corps' regula-
tion of the "other waters" at issue in the case. The Court
never engaged in such analysis, ignoring Justice Stevens'
contention that the requisite ecological connection was
present." For the SWANCC Court to represent that the ear-
lier decision depended on the relation of the wetlands at is-
sue to navigability is at best incorrect. If the Court had been
candid, rather than disingenuous, it would simply have ac-
knowledged that it was rejecting the rationale of Riverside
Bayview Homes." This switch in the Court's rationale is es-
a wetland that actually abuts on a navigable waterway, re-
spondent was required to have a permit in this case.
[d. at 135,16ELRat 20089(footnoteomitted).
63. See id. at 135 n.c, 16 ELR at2oo89 0.9, where the Court stated that:
Of course, it may well be that not every adjacent wetland is of
great importance to the environment of adjoining bodies of
water. But the existence of such cases does not seriously un-
dermine the Corps' decision to define all adjacent wetlands
as "waters.t' If it is reasonable for the Corps to conclude that
in the majority of cases, adjacent wetlands have significant
effects on water quality and the aquatic ecosystem, its defini-
tion can stand. That the definition may include some
wetlands that are not significantly intertwined with the eco-
system of adjacent waterways is oflittle moment, for where it
appears that a wetland covered by the Corps' definition is in
fact lacking in importance to the aquatic environment--or
where its importance is outweighed by other values-the
Corps may always allow development of the wetland for
other uses simply by issuing a permit. See 33 CFR
§320.4(b)(4)(1985).
[d.
64. See 121S.Ct. at 685n.2,3t ELRa120385n.2.
[A]lthough the majority and petitioner both refer to the wa-
ters on petitioner's site as "isolated," their role as habitat for
migratory birds, birds that serve important functions in the
ecosystems of other waters throughout North America, sug-
gests that--ecologically speaking-the waters at issue in this
case are anything but isolated.
[d. (citations omitted).
Under the reasoning of Riverside Bayview Homes, see supra note
63, the Corps' conclusion regarding ecological significance would
be reviewed based on the ecological value of all so-called isolated
waters, while the particularized judgment about the ecological value
of a particular site would be relevant to the decision whether to grant
a permit. The cumulative ecological value of other waters appears to
be quite significant. See JON KUSLER, THE SWANCC DECISION
AND STATE REGULATION OF WETLANDS 1 (2001) (The Court's de-
cision in SWANCC"potentially removes much of the [CWA] protec-
tion for 30% to 60% ofthe Nation's wetlands.") (prepared for the As-
sociation of State Wetland Managers. Inc.) (on me with author).
65. Cf UnitedStatesv.Bryan,339U.S.323,345-46(1950)(Jackson,
J., concurring) ("the principle of stare decisis ... is not well served
by failing to make explicit an overruling which is implicit in a
later decision").
To the extent that the SWANCC Court seeks to distinguish River-
side Bayview Homes, it recasts the earlier case as grounded on spe-
cific acquiescence by Congress:
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pecially unfortunate because, if the Court had expressed
SWANCC's cramped view of CWAjurisdiction when it de-
cided Riverside Bayview Homes in 1985, Congress may
well have broadened the Act's grant of jurisdiction when it
amended the Act in 1987." The Court's contextually re-
sponsive, sympathetic approach in 1985 gave Congress no
notice of the need for an amendment.
Even apart from SWANCC's deviation from the Court's
construction of CWA jurisdiction in Riverside Bayview
Homes, SWANCC's reasoning is doubtful on its own terms.
The majority's interpretive method in SWANCC has two
important consequences for defining the jurisdictional
scope of the CWA, both of which will be discussed in detail.
First, the Court's reliance on statutory text allowed the Court
to ignore almost entirely the context of the 1972 enactment"
and the 1977 amendment of the statute. Second, the Court's
use of a clear statement rule gave the Court license both to
ignore strong evidence of legislative intent and purpose
supporting the exercise of jurisdiction over "other waters"
[Ojur holding was based in large measure upon Congress'
unequivocal acquiescence to, and approval of, the Corps'
regulations interpreting the CWA to cover wetlands adjacent
to navigable waters. We found that Congress' concern for the
protection afwater quality and aquatic ecosystems indicated
its intent to regulate wetlands "inseparably bound up with the
'waters' of the United States."
121 S. o. at 680, 31 ELR at 20383 (citations omitted).
Justice Stevens viewed Riverside Bayview Homes as accepting that
Congress had acquiesced more broadly in the Corps' regulations:
OUf broad finding in Riverside Bayview that the 1977 Con-
gress had acquiesced in the Corps' understanding of its juris-
diction applies equally to the 41D-acre parcel at issue here.
Moreover, once Congress crossed the legal watershed that
separates navigable streams of commerce from marshes and
inland lakes, there is no principled reason for limiting the
statute's protection to those waters or wetlands that happen to
lie near a navigable stream.
ld. at 685,31 ELR at 20385 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Moreover, Justice Stevens claimed that the Court's acceptance of
the acquiescence argument in the earlier case bound the SWANCC
Court based on stare decisis:
Even if the majority were correct that Congress did not ex-
tend the Corps' jurisdiction in the 1972 CWA to reach be-
yond navigable waters and their nonnavigable tributaries,
Congress' rejection of the House's efforts in 1977 to cut back
on the Corps' 1975 assertion of jurisdiction clearly indicates
congressional acquiescence in that assertion. Indeed, our
broad determination in Riverside Bayview that the 1977 Con-
gress acquiesced in the very regulations at issue in this case
should foreclose petitioner's present urgings to the contrary.
The majority's refusal in todays decision to acknowledge
the scope of our prior decision is troubling. Having already
concluded that Congress acquiesced in the Corps' regulatory
definition of its jurisdiction, the Court is wrong to reverse
course today.
Jd. at 690-91, 31 ELR at 20387 (citations and footnotes omitted).
66. Pub. L. No. 100-4.
67. The majority does include the following limited discussion of the
legislative history of the 1972 Act in a footnote:
Although the Conference Report includes the statement that
the conferees "intend that the term 'navigable waters' be
given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation,"
neither this, nor anything else in the legislative history to
which respondents point, signifies that Congress intended to
exert anything more than its commerce power over naviga-
tion. Indeed, respondents admit that the legislative history is
somewhat ambiguous.
121S. Ct. at 680 n.3, 31 ELR at 20383 n.3 (citationsomitted).
and to trump the Corps' long-standing interpretation of
the CWA.
Textualism's "Pernicious Oversimplification" of the
CWA's Contextual Meaning
As Justice Felix Frankfurter argued:
The notion that because the words of a statute are plain,
its meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious oversim-
plification .... A statute, like other living organisms, de-
rives significance and sustenance from its environment,
from which it cannot be severed without being muti-
lated. Especially is this true where the statute, like the
one before us, is part of a legislative process having a
history and a purpose. The meaning of such a statute
cannot be gained by confining inquiry within its four
comers. Only the historic process of which such legis-
lation is an incomplete fragment-that to which it
gave rise as well as that which gave rise to it-s-can
yield its true meaning .... 68
By relying on text alone, the Court's decision in
SWANCC "perniciousjly] oversimplifi[ es]" the meaning of
the CWA. In his dissent, Justice Stevens identified several
reasons why the Court's reading of the statute is flawed.
First, Justice Stevens described how Congress redefined
its rationale for regulating the nation's waters in the CWA
of 1972. His historically rich, contextual approach "illu-
minate[s]" the CWA "by a reference to the history offed-
eral water regulation, a history that the majority largely
ignores."" Justice Stevens concluded this survey by stat-
ing that:
The shift in the focus offederal water regulation from
protecting navigability toward environmental protection
reached a dramatic climax in 1972, with the passage of
the CWA. The Act, which was passed as an amendment
to the existing FWPCA, was universally described by its
supporters as the first truly comprehensive federal water
pollution legislation. The "major purpose" of the CWA
was "to establish a comprehensive long-range policy for
the elimination of water pollution ."70
Justice Stevens' analysis is quite reminiscent of then-Justice
William H. Rehnquist's analysis for a unanimous Court in
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States. 71 There, the Court had to de-
cide "[ w]hether the Government has an implied easement to
68. United States v, Mania, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
69. 121 S. Ct. at 685, 31 ELRat 20385. The history summarized by Jus-
tice Stevens related to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and judi-
cial interpretation of §13 of that statute, as well as the 1948 Federal
Water Pollution Control Act and the 1972 Amendments to that stat-
ute, which yielded the modem CWA. See id.
70. ld. at 686. 31ELRat 20385-86(quotingS. Rep. No.92-414,at 95
(1971) (emphasis in original)). The CWA defines "pollutant" to in-
clude "dredged spoil" as well as "solid waste, ... rock, [and] sand"
that are discharged into waters. 33 U.S.c. §1362(6). In his dissent,
Justice Stevens also stated that "Itlr is fait to characterize the [CWA]
as 'watershed' legislation. The statute endorsed fundamental
changes in both the purpose and the scope offederal regulation of the
Nation's waters." 121 S. Ct. at 685, 31 ELR at 20385; see also id. at
687,31 ELR at 20386 ("This Court was therefore undoubtedly cor-
rect when it described the 1972 amendments as establishing 'a com-
prehensive program for controlling and abating water pollution."
(quoting Train v,City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37, 5 ELR 20162
(1975)).
71. 440 U.S. 668 (1979). Justice White did not participate in the Court's
decision. ld. at 688.
31 ELR 10936 ENVIRONMENTALLAWREPORTER 8-2001
build a road across land that was originally granted to the
Union Pacific Railroad under the Union Pacific Act of
1862-a grant that was part of a governmental scheme to
subsidize the construction of the transcontinental rail-
road."" The government claimed that the statutory text was
ambiguous and relied on "the familiar canon of construction
that, when grants to federal lands are at issue, ani doubts are
resolved for the Government not against it." The Court
concluded that the application of the canon was trumped by
clear congressional intent," apparent in the history of the
Union Pacific land grants, that showed an intent to grant
land broadly in order to ensure construction of the railroad. 75
In SWANCC, the dissent's historically rich contextual analy-
sis of the CWA demonstrates that the majority's insistence
that the CWAmandates a navigability nexus is anachronis-
tic and otherwise wrong headed."
Justice Stevens bolstered his elaboration of the CWA's
historical context by summarizing the legislative history re-
lated to the Act's broad definition of "navigable waters."
The history of that legislative process showed that "the 1972
conferees arrived at the final formulation by specifically de-
leting the word 'navigable' from the definition that had orig-
inally appeared in the House version of the Act. The major-
ity today undoes that deletion."" Moreover, the Conference
Committee Report showed that this deletion was intended to
extend the Act's jurisdiction to the limits of Congress ' con-
. . I 78stitutiona power.
Finally, Justice Stevens highlighted the cramped and con-
trived nature of the majority's adherence to the navigability
nexus by considering the purpose of the CWA and contrast-
ing it with the purpose ofthe Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA)
72. Jd. at 669.
73. ld. at 682 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
74. See id. at 682-83.
75. See id:
76. The Court's textualist method led to a similarly anachronistic and
wrong-headed interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act in an-
other recent decision. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S.
Ct. 1302 (2001). The alignment of the Justices there was the same
alignment as in SWANCC and Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000).
77. 121 S. Ct. at 687.31 ELRat 20386 (footnoteomitted).
78. See id. at 687-88, 31 ELR at 20386 (citations omitted). where Iustice
Stevens argued that:
The Conference Report explained that the definition in
§502(7) was intended to "be given the broadest possible
constitutional interpretation." The Court dismisses this
clear assertion of legislative intent with the back of its
hand. The statement, it claims, "signifies that Congress in-
tended to exert [nothing] more than its commerce power
over navigation."
The majority's reading drains all meaning from the confer-
ence amendment. By 1972, Congress' Commerce Clause
power over "navigation" had long since been established.
Why should Congress intend that its assertion offederal juris-
diction be given the "broadest possible constitutional inter-
pretation" if it did not intend to reach beyond the very heart-
land of its commerce power? The activities regulated by the
CWA have nothing to do with Congress' "commerce power
over navigation." Indeed, the goals of the 1972 statute have
nothing to do with navigation at all.
/d. (emphasis in original; citations omitted). See also id: at 688, 31
ELR at 20386 ("Viewed in light of the history of federal water regu-
lation, the broad §502(7) definition, and Congress' unambiguous in-
structions in the Conference Report, it is clear that the term 'naviga-
ble waters' operates in the statute as a shorthand for 'waters over
which federal authority may properly be asserted.''').
of 1899." Employing the legal process method for identify-
ing a statute's purpose,'O Justice Stevens contrasted §13 of
the RHA with §404 of the CWA and concluded that the for-
mer statute had the purpose of eliminating obstructions to
navigation with no independent concern for pollution pre-
vention, while the sole purpose of the latter Act was to pre-
vent pollution and degradation ofthe nation's waters." The
dissent then related that purpose of the 1972 Act to Con-
gress' treatment of the jurisdictional scope of the Act:
Because of the [CWA's]ambitious and comprehen-
sive goals. it was, of course, necessary to expand its ju-
risdictional scope. Thus, although Congress opted to
carry over the traditionaljurisdictional term "navigable
waters" from the RHA and prior versions of the
FWPCA,it broadenedthe definition of that term to en-
compass all "watersof the United States."82
79. 30 Stat. 1152.
80. This method is described in HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND ApPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994). These authors describe the method as follows:
The gist of this [purposivist] approach is to infer purpose by
comparing the new law with the old. Why would reasonable
men, confronted with the law as it was, have enacted this new
law to replace it? ...
The most reliable guides to an answer will be found in the
instances of unquestioned application of the statute ....
Once these points of reference are established, they throw
a double light. The purposes necessarily implied in them illu-
minate facets of the general purpose. At the same time they
provide a basis for reasoning by analogy to the disputed ap-
plication in hand ....
Jd. at 1378.
Justice Stevens pursued exactly this analysis:
Section 404 of the CWA resembles §13 of the RHA, but,
unlike the earlier statute, the primary purpose of which is the
maintenance of navigability, §404 was principally intended
as a pollution control measure. A comparison of the contents
of the RHA and the 1972 Act vividly illustrates the funda-
mental difference between the purposes of the two provi-
sions. The earlier statute contains pages of detailed appropri-
ations for improvements in specific navigation facilities. 30
Stat. 1121-1149, forstudiesconcerning the feasibility ofaca-
nal across the Isthmus of Panama, id..• at 1150, and for sur-
veys of the advisability of harbor improvements at numerous
other locations, id., at 1155-1161. Tellingly, § 13, which
broadly prohibits the discharge of refuse into navigable wa-
ters, contains an exception for refuse "flowing from streets
and sewers ... in a liquid state." ld., at 1152.
The 1972 Act, in contrast, appropriated large sums of
money for research and related programs for water pollution
control, 86 Stat. 816-833, and for the construction of water
treatment works, id., at 833-844. Strikingly absent from its
declaration of "goals and policy" is any reference to avoiding
or removing obstructions to navigation. Instead, the principal
objective of the Act, as stated by Congress in § 101, was "to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. §1251. Congress
therefore directed federal agencies in § 102 to "develop com-
prehensive programs for preventing, reducing, or eliminating
the pollution of the navigable waters and ground waters and
improving the sanitary condition of surface and underground
waters." 33 U.S.C. §1252. The CWA commands federal
agencies to give "due regard," not to the interest of unob-
structed navigation, but rather to "improvements which are
necessary to conserve such waters for the protection and
propagation of fish and aquatic life and wildlife [and] recre-
ational purposes."
121 S. Ct. at 687, 31 ELR at 20386 (emphasis in original).
81. Jd.
82. Jd. (quoting33 U.S.C. §1362(7)) (footnoteomitted).
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The majority's textualist method also resulted in the
Court's failure to account for the contextual insights into
CWA jurisdiction that may be gained from considering the
1977 Amendments. In his dissent, Justice Stevens reviewed
how Congress considered in 1977 the broad assertion of
CWA jurisdiction by the Corps." As part of that consider-
ation, Congress rejected an amendment that would have re-
imposed a navigability limit On the Corps' jurisdiction,"
leading Justice Stevens to conclude that "[t]he net result of
that extensive debate was a congressional endorsement of
the position that the Corps maintains today.,,85
Justice Stevens relied, moreover, on several provisions
enacted by Congress in 1977 to gain a contextual under-
standing of the scope of CWA jurisdiction. First, Justice
Stevens described how the enactment of §404(g) in 1977
confirmed that Congress viewed CWAjurisdiction far more
broadly than the SWANCC majority accepted. In
§404(g)(I), Congress allowed states to develop programs
for the issuance of §404 permits when the affected waters
are "navigable waters (other than those waters which are
presently used, or are susceptible to use in their natural con-
dition or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport
interstate or foreign commerce ... ).,,'6 Justice Stevens rea-
soned that:
Section 404(g)(l)'s reference to navigable waters
"other than those waters which are presently used, or are
susceptible to use" for transporting commerce and their
adjacent wetlands appears to suggest that Congress
viewed (and accepted) the Act's regulations as covering
more than navigable waters in the traditional sense. The
majority correctly points out that §404(g)(1) is itself am-
biguous because it does not indicate precisely how far
Congress considered federal jurisdiction to extend. But
the Court ignores the provision's legislative history,
which makes clear that Congress understood
§404(g)(1)-and tberefore federal jurisdiction-to ex-
tend, not only to navigable waters and nonnavigable trib-
utaries, but also to "isolated" waters, such as those at is-
sue in this case."
Justice Stevens also relied on two exceptions from the per-
mit requirement included in §404(t) by the 1977 Amend-
ments to show that Congress recognized that the Act applied
to "other waters.''" The SWANCC majority, however, de-
clined to give these statutory provisions any weight in inter-
preting the meaning of the textual definition of "navigable
83. See id. at 689-90, 31 ELR at 20387.
84. See id.
85. Jd. at 690, 31 ELR at 20387.
86. 33 U.S.c. §t344(g)(l), ELR STAT.FWPCA §404(g)(1).
87. t21 S. Ct. at 69t-92, 31 ELR at 20388.
88. Justice Stevens wrote that
[T]he 1977 amendments expressly exclude from the Corps'
regulatory power the discharge of fill material "for the pur-
pose of construction or maintenance of farm or stock ponds or
irrigation ditches, or the maintenance of drainage ditches,"
and "for the purpose of construction of temporary sedimenta-
tion basins on a construction site which does not include
placement of fill material into the navigable waters." [33
U.S.c. §t344(f)(t), ELR STAT.FWPCA §404(f)(l).] The
specific exemption of these waters from the Corps' jurisdic-
tion indicates that the 1977 Congress recognized that simi-
larly "isolated" waters not covered by the exceptions would
fall within the statute's outer limits.
Id. at 691,31 ELR at 20387 (emphasis in original).
waters.,,89 The contextual importance of the 1977 Amend-
ments was markedly different for Justice Stevens: "The leg-
islative history of the 1977 amendments therefore plainly
establishes that, when it enacted §404(g), Congress be-
Iieved-s-and desired-i-the Corps' jurisdiction to extend be-
yond just navigable waters, their tributaries, and the
wetlands adjacent to each,"oo
In sum, the Court's textualist method in SWANCC yields
an interpretation of the CWA that is nonresponsive to the
novelty and breadth of the statutory scheme. As the follow-
ing section shows, the Court also used a clear statement rule
to foreclose the Corps' reliance on Chevron deference to an
agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute.
SWANCC and the Judicial Activism of Clear
Statement Rules
Not content to rest wholly on its view of the "clear meaning"
of the CWA text, the majority employed a clear statement
rule as well to reject definitively the Corps' reliance on
Chevron deference." The Court's use of the clear statement
rule in SWANCC is important in two respects: it exemplifies
how the Court's textualists have continued to adapt doc-
trines of statutory construction to ensure sufficient judicial
power to dictate particular interpretive results, and it contin-
ues the conservative Court's efforts to apply the Chevron
doctrine in ways that constrain broad grants of discretion to
agencies. Each of these important aspects of SWANCC will
be considered in turn.
SWANCC and the Application of a Clear Statement
Requirement
The Court in SWANCC was reviewing the Corps' assertion
of regulatory jurisdiction over aquatic sites that had no
physical connection with waters traditionally accepted as
89. Regarding the relevance of §404(t), enacted as part of the 1977
Amendments, the Court concluded that "[a]s §404(a) only regulates
dredged or fill material that is discharged 'into navigable waters,'
Congress' decision to exempt certain types of these discharges does
not affect, much less address, the definition of 'navigable waters. ",
ld. at 682 n.7, 31 ELRat20384 n.7. The Court rejected the relevance
of §404(g), added by the 1977 Amendments, for similar reasons:
But §404(g) gives no intimation of what those waters might
be; it simply refers to them as "other ... waters." Respondents
conjecture that "other . , . waters" must incorporate the
Corps' 1977 regulations, but it is also plausible, as petitioner
contends, that Congress simply wanted to include all waters
adjacent to "navigable waters," such as nonnavigable tribu-
taries and streams. The exact meaning of §404(g) is not be-
fore us and we express no opinion on it, but for present pur-
poses it is sufficient to say, as we did in Riverside Bayview
Homes, that "§404(g)( 1)does not conclusively determine the
construction to be placed on the use of the term 'waters' else-
where in the Act (particularly in §502(7), which contains the
relevant definition of 'navigable waters') .... "
fd. at 682,31 ELR at 20384 (citation and footnote omitted). The Riv-
erside Bayview Homes Court did, however, stale regarding the sec-
tions of the CWA enacted in 1977 that "in light of the fact that the
various provisions of the Act should be read in pari materia, it does
at least suggest strongly that the term 'waters' as used in the Act does
not necessarily exclude 'wetlands.''' 474 U.S. at 138 n.ll, 16ELR at
20090 n.lt.
90. 121S. Ct. at 692. 31 ELR at 20388.
91. See id. at 683,31 ELR at 20384 ("We find §404(a) to be clear, but
even were we to agree with respondents, we would not extend Chev-
ron deference here.").
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navigable. If permitted by the U.S. Constitution, Congress
would have to have delegated authority to regulate these wa-
ters based on an exercise of its powers under the U.S. Com-
merce Clause.'2 The SWANCC majority, accordingly, would
arguably have applied a well-accepted rule of construction
ifit had interpreted the CWA to have a meaning that did not
raise the question of constitutional infinnity, provided that
the interpretation was "fairly possible."" Justice Stevens
would no doubt have rejected this conventional use of the
canon, however, based on his view that Congress plainly in-
tended to exercise all of its Commerce Clause power when it
enacted the CWA.94
During the last quarter century, however, the Supreme
Court has changed the effect to be given to the avoidance of
constitutional questions canon. The beginning of this
change can be observed in National Labor Relations Board
v. Catholic Bishop ojChicago." There, then-Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger gave the canon a stronger legal effect, so
that the canon, when applicable, required that there be a
"clear expression of an affirmative intention of Congress't'"
before the Court would construe a statute "in a manner that
could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sen-
sitive" constitutional questions." The Catholic Bishop
Court indicated by its inquiry into the text as well as legisla-
tive history that Congress need not express the necessary
clear intent in the statute's text."
During the past 15 years, the Rehnquist Court has pur-
sued the textualist approach to interpretation with greater
frequency." At the same time, the Rehnquist Court has fur-
ther modified the effect of the canon favoring avoidance of
constitutional questions. In Gregory v.Ashcroft, 100 the Court
held that, before it will construe a statute in a way that raises
a question of whether it violates constitutional requirements
of federalism, "it must be plain to anyone reading the Act"
that the statute has the constitutionally questionable mean-
ing.'?' This change in the canon's effect means thatthe clear
statement must now be in the text, rather than in the legisla-
tive history. This new requirement, of course, goes well be-
yond the rationale of Catholic Bishop, which sought to en-
sure congressional deliberation on the question of constitu-
tional import, and runs a serious risk of disingenuous inter-
pretive results.102 Indeed, a cynical view of the use of clear
92. SeeU.S. CONST. art. I, §7. Justice Stevens concluded that Congress'
delegation of regulatory jurisdiction was constitutional: "The Corps'
exercise of its §404 permitting power over 'isolated' waters that
serve as habitat for migratory birds falls well within the boundaries
set by this Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence." 121 S. Ct. at
694, 31 ELR at 20388.
93. See, e.g .•Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961); Murray
v. The Charming Betsy. 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804).
94. See 121 S. Ct. at 688, 31 ELR at 20386.
95. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
96. /d. at 504.
97. [d. at 507.
98. See id. at 504-07 (examining statutory text and legislative history for
evidence of any afftnnative intention of Congress).
99. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA
L. REV. 621 (1990); Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds
of Statute and Common Law, SUP. Cr. REV. 429, 444-47 (1994).
100. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
101. [d. at 467.
102. See Frank E. Horack Jr., The Disintegration of Statutory Construc-
tion, 24 IND. L.J. 335 (1949).
statement rules by the Rehnquist Court would be that the
Court's textualists have found that they need to have rules of
construction available to them that will trump the plain,
though not explicit, meaning, of broadly written statutory
text when they view the interpretive result directed by the
text as objectionable. 103
In SWANCC, the Court concluded that the application of a
clear statement rule was triggered by the Corps' assertion of
regulatory jurisdiction that was constitutionally question-
able because the exercise of Commerce Clause power was
uncertain 104 and because asserting federal regulatory power
was doubtful based on federalism principles.105 As has al-
Rules of interpretation in the nature of presumption are the
hardest with which to deaL They are fictional rules of inter-
pretation and frequently lead to results exactly opposite those
which legislatures intend. At best they are judicial standards
requiring a particular form of legislative expression. As
such, they are within limits defensible. Every system of
government depends upon the ability of society to require of
its people certain formalities as prerequisite to legal conse-
quence. It is not too much to require this of the agencies of
government as well. Formalities, however, become intoler-
able when they no longer reflect the normal expectations of
the society for which they were constructed. To test thus the
rules of presumed intention discloses that they are alto-
gether unsatisfactory.
[d. at 342.
In the early twentieth century, Dean Pound voiced the concern
that courts might engage in an activist construction of statutes to
avoid the effects of legislative enactments:
There are two ways in which the courts impede or thwart so-
ciallegislation demanded by the industrial conditions of to-
day. The first is narrow and illiberal construction of constitu-
tional provisions, state and federal. ... The second is a nar-
row and illiberal attitude toward legislation conceded to be
constitutional, regarding it as out of place in the legal sys-
tem, as an alien element to be held down to the strictest lim-
its and not to be applied beyond the requirements of its ex-
press language. The second is by no means so conspicuous
as the first, but is not on that account the less unfortunate or
the less dangerous ....
Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV.
383,385 (1908).
103. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
Ptrst.tc POt.lCY (2d ed. 1995)
Critics could suggest that cases like Gregory demonstrate
that texrualism fails to live up to its promise of providing ob-
jective interpretive methods in the face of outcomes judges
cannot tolerate .... For conservative textualists who care
about federalism, the safety valve when textualism gets them
boxed in ... is the creation of a super-strong clear statement
rule that trumps the result suggested by plain meaning.
[d.
104. See 121 S. Ct. at 683.31 ELR at 20384.
105. See id. at 683-84, 31 ELR at 20384-85. Justice Stevens found the
Court's federalism concerns "ironic":
It is particularly ironic for the Court to raise the specter of
federalism while construing a statute that makes explicit ef-
forts to foster local control over water regulation. Faced with
calls to cut back on federal jurisdiction over water pollution,
Congress rejected attempts to narrow the scope of that juris-
diction and, by incorporating §404(g), opted instead for a
scheme that encouraged States to supplant federal control
with their own regulatory programs.
ld. at 693, 31 ELR at 20388 (citation omitted). For a discussion of
how the Court's new federalism doctrines may apply to federal envi-
ronmental law, see Stephen R. McAllister & Robert L.Glicksman,
Federal Environmental Law in the "New" Federalism Era, 30 ELR
iuza (Dec. 2(00).
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ready been discussed.l'" the SWANCC Court was evasive
in explaining whether the clear statement must be in the
form of clear statutory text or clear intent. SWANCC's rule
thus appears like the rules in both Catholic Bishop and
Gregory. In any event, given the clear statement require-
ment, Congress' deletion of the word "navigable" wben
defining the CWA's jurisdictional scope was insufficient
to grant the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction over isolated
waters. In the Court's view, such jurisdiction could be ex-
ercised only if Congress made specific provision for it in
the statute and the exercise of jurisdiction were found to
be constitutional.
In sum, SWANCC continues the Rehnquist Court's judi-
cially active application of clear statement requirements.
Given that Congress had no reason to expect either in 1972
or 1977 that the exercise of regulatory jurisdiction over
"other waters" would be constitutionally suspect under the
Commerce Clause and federalism principles, the Court's
imposition of the requirement in 2001, based on constitu-
tional doctrine established in the last decade,107makes the
Court appear to be engaging in "bait-and-switch" tactics
with Congress.IO' The next section will discuss how the
Court's use of the clear statement rule was especially activ-
ist since it wholly foreclosed Chevron deference.
SWANCC and the Court's New Limits on the
Administrative State
We have already seen that the SWANCC Court failed to ad-
here to the principle of stare decisis when it rejected the Riv-
erside Bayview Homes Court's understandillj of the discre-
tion accorded to the Corps by the CWA.1 Although the
106. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
107. See United State, v. Lopez. 5t4 U.S. 549 (t995); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
108. Professors Eskridge and Frickey have criticized the Court's use of
clear statement rules in some recent cases as evidencing a
"bait-and-switch" approach to statutory interpretation:
[Two recent] decisions surely came as a surprise to Congress.
Indeed, there isa "bait and switch" feature to [these] cases ... :
when Congress enacted the statutes in question. the constitu-
tionality of the state-infringing provisions was clear and Con-
gress could not have anticipated the Gregory rule; nor could a
reasonable observer have predicted the expansion of Gregory
in [the second case]. When the Court's practice induces Con-
gress to behave in a certain way and the Court then switches
the rules. Congress justifiably feels taken.
William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium. 108 HARV. L. REV. 26. 85 (1994) (footnote omitted).
These authors also made the following telling criticism of the
Court's recent use of clear statement rules:
When candidly set forth and applied, clear statement rules are
among the many ways the Court can signal to Congress its
concerns about the constitutionality of government actions.
But when the Court transparently manipulates the canons to
fit its own substantive agenda, the Court places its credibility
and legitimacy at risk. Like the Court's erratic textualist per-
formance in statutory cases, its application of quasi-constitu-
tional clear statement rules has been tactically clever in the
short-term but institutionally risky in the longer-term. The
Court's adventurism has been most apparent, and most nor-
matively questionable, in the super-strong clear statement
rules protecting states' rights at the expense of individual
rights and national policies.
Id. at 81-82 (footnote omitted).
109. See supra section, SWANCC's Inconsistency With Stare Decisis.
Court broke with CWA statutory precedent, its decision in
SWANCCwas faithful to the RehnquistCourt's recent use of
the textualist method supplemented by clear statement rules
to constrain broad exercises of agency regulatory author-
ity.110This line ofRehnquist Court precedent began with the
decision in MCl Telecommunications Corp. v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. 111 There, Justice Antonin Scalia
relied heavily on the etymology and (related) dictionary
meaning of the word "modify," in the Communications Act
of 1934.112 Concluding that the word granted the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) authority to make
only incremental changes, 113the Court struck down an FCC
regulation that made a "fundamental change in the Act's tar-
iff-filing requirement.Y'" The Court stated that "[i]t is
highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determina-
tion of whether an industry will be entirely, or even substan-
tially, rate-regulated to agency discretion-and even more
unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle de-
vice as permission to 'modify' rate-filing require-
ments.?" Although the theory of Chevron was that our gov-
emmental structure allocated policymaking decisions to ad-
ministrative agencies rather than to the courts, by its textual-
ist method in MCl, the Court held that Congress had im-
posed a significant limit on the breadth of its delegation of
regulatory discretion by its use of the word "modify" in the
statute's text.
Just last term, the Court, in Food & Drug Administration
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,"6 considered
whether the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had au-
thority to regulate tobacco under the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act (FDCA)l17 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writ-
ing for the same conservative majority that decided
SWANCC, viewed the MCl case as reflecting a strong con-
cern that settled law be unsettled by an agency only when
the statutory text clearly grants an agency power to change
the settled law.1is In reviewing the terms of the FDCA, the
Court felt "confident that Congress could not have intended
to delegate a decision of such economic andRolitical signifi-
cance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion." 9 In the Court's
view, the FDA's decision to regulate tobacco failed under
the first step of Chevron: there can have been no implicit
delegation of such broad regulatory authority. In both these
110. For an elaborate analysis of the relation between the textualist
method and Chevron deference, see Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism
and theFuture of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 352
(1994). See also Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the
Chevron Doctrine: In Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REV.
393 (1996).
in. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
112. 48 Stal. 1064. a, amended.
113. See 5t2 u.s, at 225-28.
114. Id. at 229. Cf
115. Id. at 231. Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, The Muzak of Justice
Scalia's Revolutionary Call to Read Unclear Statutes Narrowly, 53
SMU L. REV, 121, 140 (2000) (t'Tc us it seems that Justice Scalia
has attempted to bring to statutory interpretation another 'new'
canon of interpretation, namely, that ambiguous statutes should be
read narrowly,").
116. 120 S. Ct. t291 (2000).
117. 21 U.S.c. §301 et seq.
118. See 120 S. Ct. at 1315.
119. Ill.
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cases, the Court employed the textualist method to hold that
the challenged agency actions effected a fundamental
change in the law and were unlawful in the absence of ex-
press permission in the statute.
Although the SWANCC Court cited neither MCI nor
Brown & Williamson, the Court employed a similar clear
statement rule requiring the expressly affirmative grant of
regulatory authority to foreclose the Corps' exercise of non-
traditional regulatory jurisdiction. The Court's use of this
clear statement rule allowed the Court to disregard strong
evidence oflegislative intent and purpose supporting the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over "other waters" and to nullify the
Corps' long-standing interpretation of the CWA.
Through its use of the clear statement rule in SWANCC,
the Court barred Congress from impliedly delegating an im-
portant regulatory issue to the Corps. When this clear state-
ment rule applies, the delegation must instead be made ex-
pressly and affirmatively by the statute. At least in Brown &
Williamson, and arguably inMCl, the Court employed its
clear statement rule to foreclose an agency's novel interpre-
tation of the regulatory authority delegated by the statute."o
In SWANCC, however, the agency interpretation foreclosed
by the Court had been in place for 15 years, had been ac-
cepted and implemented by 3 administrations, and had been
reviewed by Congress. Such an activist use ofa clear state-
ment rule is contrary to the spirit of Chevron, which recog-
nized that administrative agencies were better placed than
courts to make political decisions arising in the implementa-
tion of statutes. The Court should not be devising rules of
construction that enable courts to declare particularized im-
plementation decisions unlawful because they were not au-
thorized in sufficiently clear terms. Such rules effectively
limit the scope of Chevron deference.
The Court's use of the clear statement rule in SWANCC
has the effect, moreover, of ignoring evidence of clear con-
gressional intent in the legislative history, structure, and
purpose of the CWA.121The Court, often in opinions written
by Justice Stevens, has employed the use ofa canon provid-
ing that a statute should not be interpreted to effect a signifi-
cant change in law when there is no indication that Congress
intended such a change.122 This canon-s-colorfully de-
120. Cf supra note 34 (discussing how an agency's long-standing under-
standing of a statute may provide strong evidence of its meaning).
121. This clear intent with regard to both the 1972 Act and 1977 Amend-
ments is discussed supra in section, Textualism's "Pernicious Over-
simplification" of the CWA's Contextual Meaning.
t22. See Chisom v. Roemer, 50t U.S. 380, 396 (1991) (Stevens, J.):
We reject that construction because we are convinced that if
Congress had such an intent, Congress would have made it
explicit in the statute, or at least some of the Members would
have identified or mentioned it at some point in the unusually
extensive legislative history of the 1982 amendment.
(footnote omitted); American Hosp. Ass'n v. National Labor Rela-
tions Bd.. 499 U.S. 606. 613-14 (t 99t) (Stevens, J.) ("If this amend-
ment had been intended to place the important limitation on the
scope of the Board's rulemaking powers that petitioner suggests, we
would expect to find some expression of that intent in the legislative
history." (citation omitted»; Williams v, United States, 458 U.S. 279
(t 982):
[I)fCongress really set out to enact a national bad check law
in § 1014, itdid so with a peculiar choice oflanguage and in an
unusually backhanded manner .... Absent support in the leg-
islative history for the proposition that § 1014 was "designed
to have general application to the passing of worthless
scribed as the dog that didn't bark rule of construction'P -is
sometimes rejected by the COurt.12'Justice Scalia, in partic-
ular, has advocated that the Court must not require Congress
to identify an intent to change the law in legislative histo&;
when the statute's text means that the law has changed.' 5
By employing its clear statement rule in SWANCC, the
Court has turned a deaf ear to the dogs barking insistently in
the legislative history of the CWA to signal Congress' plain
intent to shift from a regime of water regulation based on
protecting navigation to one based on protecting water qual-
ity and the ecosystems dependent on that quality126 Re-
checks," we are not prepared to hold petitioner's conduct pro-
scribed by that particular statute.
Id. at 287 (citation and footnote omitted).
See also United States v, Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1885,28
ELR 21225, 21227 (1998) ("nothing in CERCLA purports to reject
this bedrock principle [of corporations law), and against this venera-
ble common-law backdrop, the congressional silence is audible.")
Cf Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256,
266-267 (1979) ("silence is most eloquent, for such reticence while
contemplating an important and controversial change in existing law
is unlikely"); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521
(1989) (Stevens, J.) ("A party contending that legislative action
changed settled law has the burden of showing that the legislature in-
tended such a change.") (citation omitted); William D. Popkin, A
Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1087,
1152 ("Justice Stevens applies this [clear-statement] doctrine when
he rejects the apparent meaning of the statutory language because it
produces results that he 'cannot believe' the legislature intended
without clear statement to that effect, especially if Congress seems
unaware of what it is doing.").
This clear-statement approach has distinguished scholarly sup-
port. See Harry H.Wellington & Lee A. Albert, Statutory Interpreta-
tion and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson,
72 YALE L.J. 1547 (1963):
[Tlhe invocation of the clear statement rule would seem ap-
propriate ... where one interpretation of a statute would work
vast and far-reaching changes in an established body of juris-
prudence, either statutory or common law. Such changes in a
body of existing doctrine is not a factor Congress is likely 10
have considered in passing a statute, and the disruption
worked by such a statute is a consideration worthy of legisla-
tive attention.
[d. at 1563 n.50.
123. This label reflects an allusion to Sherlock Holmes's use of the evi-
dence of the dog that didn't bark. See Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
446 U.S. 578, 602, 10 ELR 20353, 20359 (1980) (Rehnquist, J ..
dissenting) ("In a case where the construction of legislative lan-
guage such as this makes so sweeping and so relatively unortho-
dox achange as that made here, I think judges as well as detectives
may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark
in the night."); Griffin v, Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,
588-89 & n.20 (1982) (Stevens, L, dissenting) (citing A. CONAN
DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 383
(1938)).
124. See PPG Indus., where the Court stated:
Illr would be a strange canon of statutory construction that
would require Congress to state in committee reports or else-
where in its deliberations that which is obvious on the face of
a statute. In ascertaining the meaning ofa statute, a court can-
not, in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of
the dog that did not bark.
!d. 446 U.S. at 592, to ELR at 20357 (footnote omitted).
125. See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 406 (Scalia, 1., dissenting) ("we have force-
fully and explicitly rejected the Conan Doyle approach to statutory
construction in the past. We are here to apply the statute, notlegisla-
tive history, and certainly not the absence oflegislative history. Stat-
utes are the law though sleeping dogs lie." (citations omitted».
126. See supra section, Textualism's "Pernicious Oversimplification" of
the CWA's Contextual Meaning.
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jecting an agency interpretation implementing that new fed-
eral regulatory regime without showing that the regulation
is an unreasonable approach to water quality protection or
that it is unconstitutional significantly erodes the number of
cases in which the Court will find an implicit or explicit del-
egation of regulatory authority to an agency and thereby
greatly restricts the range of Chevron deference. In the place
of deference, this activist, textualist Court has assumed the
power to force Congress to delegate regulatory authority
with specificity.
Conclusion
In sum, by its rejection of the Corps' assertion of regulatory
jurisdiction over isolated waters, the SWANCC Court has
improperly abandoned statutory stare decisis and has ig-
nored clear congressional intent to provide comprehensive
protection of the nation's waters. The analytic approach
taken by the Court means not only that many wetland areas
will no longer be protected by federal law, but also that
agencies have less ability to regulate in ways that the Court
finds to be excessive.
